

REMARKS

The present application was filed on December 1, 1998 with claims 1 through 28. Claims 1 through 35 are presently pending in the above-identified patent application. Claims 1, 8, 15, 16, 22, and 28 are amended herein.

5 In the Office Action, the Examiner has rejected claims 1, 8, 15, 16, 22, and 28 under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter that applicant regards as the invention. The Examiner also rejected claims 1-4, 8-11, 15-19, 22-25 and 28 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by Tagawa (United States Patent No. 5,991,773). In
10 addition, claims 5-7, 12-14, 20, 21, 26 and 27 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Tagawa in view of Freeman et al. (United States Patent No. 6,006,227).

Section 112 Rejections

15 Claims 1, 8, 15, 16, 22, and 28 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. Regarding claim 1 (and claims 16, 22 and 28), the Examiner asserts that “it is unclear where Applicant’s step is in the claim for the ‘creation time-stamp,’” and that there appears to be a step missing.

20 Applicant notes that claim 1 is directed to a method for providing an electronic document and refers to both a creation time-stamp and a requested time-stamp. The versions of the electronic document are identified by a creation time-stamp, which is created *prior* to the utilization of the method for providing the electronic document. In other words, *an electronic document having a creation time-stamp is assumed to exist*
25 *prior to the execution of the methods defined by Claims 1, 16, 22, and 28.* Thus, the method of claim 1 should not include the step of creating the “creation time-stamp.”

With regard to claims 8 and 15, the Examiner has asserted that a limitation is unclear as written. Applicant has amended claims 8 and 15 to address the concerns of the Examiner.

30 Applicant respectfully requests withdrawal of the rejection under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph.

Independent Claims

Claims 1, 8, 15, 16, 22, and 28 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by Tagawa. With regard to claim 1, for example, the Examiner asserts that Tagawa teaches all of the limitations recited by claim 1.

5 The present invention provides a persistent domain name server that allows a user to refer to historical Web resources, for example, following a corporate merger or domain name change. If company A is merged into company B, all the web pages referred through “www.A.com” may no longer be valid. The disclosed persistent domain name server utilizes the dated URL to determine where the historical information
10 of company A is located for the requested time period and translates the request to a new machine containing the historical information of company A. See, Summary, final paragraph, and page 9, line 20, to page 11, line 11.

Tagawa does not address the situation of redirecting a request containing a requested time stamp to a new domain, when the requested domain no longer exists.
15 Each of the independent claims have been amended to emphasize that “a server identified by said requested domain name does not provide said desired version at a time of said request and said identified server has a redirected domain name that is different than said requested domain name.” In fact, no suggestion can be found in Tagawa of redirecting a first requested domain www.A.com to a new domain name www.B.com.

20 As discussed in the specification on page 10, if company A is now part of company B (for example, following a merger), and a user requests the following URL, “http://www.A.com?time=2+2+1992,” the “server identified by said requested domain name does not provide said desired version at a time of said request.” Thus, the request will be redirected to “123.2.3.222 redirect” (associated with company B), such that the
25 “identified server has a redirected domain name that is different than said requested domain name.”

Thus, Tagawa does not disclose or suggest “a server identified by said requested domain name does not provide said desired version at a time of said request and said identified server has a redirected domain name that is different than said
30 requested domain name,” as required by each of the independent claims as amended.

Applicant thus respectfully requests the withdrawal of the rejection under Section 102.

Dependent Claims

Claims 2-7, 9-14, 17-21, and 23-27 are dependent on independent claims 1, 8, 16, 22, and 28, respectively and are therefore patentably distinguished over Tagawa and Freeman et al. because of their dependency from independent claims 1, 8, 16, 22, and 28 for the reasons set forth above, as well as other elements these claims add in combination to their base claim.

With regard to claims 5 and 13, the Examiner asserts that Freeman et al. teaches transmitting the version of said electronic document with the most recent creation time-stamp preceding the requested time-stamp if a version of said electronic document does not exist with the requested time-stamp. The Examiner asserts that this teaching is supported by a suggestion in Freeman et al. to set “the time to the future or past is to reset the time cursor temporary to a fixed position designated by the user.” By now means does this teaching in Freeman et al. disclose or suggest “transmitting the version of said electronic document with the *most recent* creation time-stamp *preceding the requested time-stamp* if a version of said electronic document does not exist with the requested time-stamp. None of these limitations are suggested by Freeman et al.

Freeman et al. is directed to an operating system in which documents are stored in a chronologically ordered "stream." As each document is presented to the operating system, the document is placed according to a time indicator in the sequence of documents already stored relative to the time indicators of the stored documents. Col. 1, lines 4-10. It is an express object of Freeman et al. to provide “an operating system in which the location and nature of file storage is *transparent to the user*, for example, the storage of the files is handled automatically **and file names are only used if a user chooses to invent such names.**” Even when a user does choose to “invent” file names, Freeman et al. does not disclose or suggest how such file names are used to retrieve documents or whether a request for such documents includes the file name and the time indication.

As indicated in the Background section of Freeman et al., Freeman et al. expressly “**teaches away**” from conventional operating systems where a “file must be ‘named’ when created and often a location in which to store the file must be indicated resulting in unneeded overhead.” Col. 1, lines 40-44. Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art of the present invention would not look to Freeman et al. for a solution to the problem of supplementing an address (or file name) so that it differentiates versions of a multiple version document. The present invention, on the other hand, extends conventional file naming or addressing schemes (where an electronic document is identified using a file name or address) to include the *time stamp* that differentiates various versions of the document.

Conclusion

All of the pending claims, i.e., claims 1 through 35, are in condition for allowance and such favorable action is earnestly solicited.

If any outstanding issues remain, or if the Examiner has any further suggestions for expediting allowance of this application, the Examiner is invited to contact the undersigned at the telephone number indicated below.

The Examiner’s attention to this matter is appreciated.

Respectfully submitted,



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Date: January 17, 2006